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MYTHICAL CRITICISM
An Evaluation of Rudolf Bultmann

Robert H. Gutheil
Adviser: Dr. A. C. Piepkorn

Rudolf Bultmann has not lacked his champions. For
many, he is almost Martin Luther redivivus. Others see
him as Satan incarnatus. No matter which is the stronger
influence, we cannot escape the undeniable importance of
this man. He is a devout churchman; a keen, critical
scholar of the Bible; and a disciple of Martin Heidegger.
His way of doing theology has begun a new chapter in the
history of interpretation.
If Bultmann's own scholarly output has been prodigious, the theological dialogue which he has engendered
has been overwhelming. A paper of this scope could not
begin to assimilate all of the relevant material. It will
be our specific purpose in the next few pages to outline
the principle features of Bultmann's mythical criticism-his call for demythologization and his existential interpretation of the kerygma. Also, we shall briefly investigate the directions in which Bultmann's thought has been
developed by his leading followers. We shall conclude
with some general observations concerning the function of
myth in literature and the validity of mythical criticism
for Biblical exegesis.
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All his early writings indicated the direction in
which Bultmann was heading, but the essay which really
began the entire debate and brought into sharp focus the
program which he had in mind was "New Testament and Mythology," published in 1941. He begins by leaving no doubt
as to which aspects of the New Testament fall under the
heading "myth." Not only the three-storied view of the
universe, but all the passages which speak of good and
evil spirits at work in the universe, everything that
points to supernatural intervention in the earthly process-all this is mythical. Our creedal statements are all
embedded in the mythical framework--God sending His Son
to earth to die on a cross and then raising Him from the
dead, the consequent defeat of death and evil spirits,
the ascent into the clouds with the promise to return at
the end of the world, the believer's involvement in this
salvation through baptism and eucharist--"all this is the
language of mythology, and the origin of the various
themes can be easily traced in the contemporary mythology
of Jewish Apocalyptic and in the redemption myths of
Gnosticism."1 For Bultmann, myth is that which speaks of
God and His action as objective and observable, immanent
in this world. "Myths give to the transcendent reality an
immanent, this-worldly objectivity."2 These words are
always chosen with extreme care, for Bultmann wishes to
be very clear as to what he is doing. When he speaks
about myth or the nature of miracles or acts of God, he
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does not at all insist that God does not act in behalf of
men. He only insists that the action of God is observable
only to faith. He has said this a number of times in a
number of ways, and it is absolutely necessary that we be
clear about this.

For instance, in his article, "Bultmann

Replies to his Critics," he says, "Faith, which speaks of
its encounter with the acts of God, cannot defend itself
against the charge of illusion, for the encounter with
God is not objective like a worldly event."3 And then
two paragraphs later, "That God cannot be seen apart from
faith does not mean that he does not exist apart from it."4
And so when he speaks of myths of the incarnation or
resurrection, he is not saying that the incarnation and
resurrection stories are fictitious legends which have a
religious or spiritual meaning. He is saying that the
reality of the incarnation and the resurrection is not
susceptible to scientific, historical proof, but is
observable only to eyes of faith.
But even more than this, the question of historical
accuracy is itself not at all a main concern. The acts
themselves have a secondary importance outside of the context of faith. To use our traditional terminology, a man
goes to hell even though God's Son died on the cross and rose
again for him if he does not believe that this is so and respond in faith to this action of God. The crucifixion and
resurrection of Jesus Christ as isolated historical events
or as abstract propositions must be brought into the present
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in order to. work their power. The contents of the word of
Christ, says Bultmann, "may also be formulated in a series
of abstract propositions," but "abstract propositions can
only become the Word of God when it is proelamation--i.e.
when it takes the shape of an event here and now in the
viva vox--that is the eschatological meaning of the 447/AR.115
There is a certain denigrating of history in all tas,
and Bultmann has been reproached by a number of critics
for his loss of the historical emphases in Christianity.
We shall discuss the relation of demythologization and
history later. At this point it is important that we see
that in his strong emphasis on the present meaning of
Christian faith, Bultmann does not feel it necessary to
deny the reality of God's acts in history. This is the
error of an earlier liberal theology to which he is as
strongly opposed as is Karl Barth. In fact, Thomas Oden
has noted the interesting situation that "the energies now
being put into a new quest for the historical Jesus are
being expended, significantly enough, not by those attacking
Bultmann for his lack of historical rootage for faith, but
precisely by Bultmann's closest associates and students."6
Moreover, those who are so concerned about thifiaistorie,
objective nature of the saving events are victims of a
kind of schizophrenic approach to the problem. Carl Braaten
has made the incisive statement,
On the one hand the historical facts in
question are said to be objective in the
sense that they may be ascertained and
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established by scientific historical
methods, while on the other hand, the
redemptive occurrences are supposedly
accessible am such only to faith. Now,
which is it?'
Why demythologize? The first answer that has been
given is that the Biblical message is patently set within
a world view that is in many ways antithetical to the
world view of modern man. Then liwwasl• neeees4rt to see
that to speak of the world view of the first century as
mythical does not necessarily flatly contradict a traditional understanding of the historical nature of the saving
events. Finally, waultmannuintistsAhatr—ibis ultimate
reason for demythologizing is that the Gospel may be preached.
All too often the Gospel simply does not get a hearing
because our scientifically-minded age has no room for
spirits, good or evil, directly involved in the course of
worldly history. Replying to Karl Jaspers, Bultmann said,
The purpose of demythologization is
not to make religion more acceptable
to modern man by trimming the traditional Biblical texts, but to make
clearer to modern man what the Christian faith is. He must be confronted
with the issue of decision, be provoked to decision by the fact that the
stumbling block to faith, the skAndalon,
is peculiarly disturbing to man in
general, not only to modern man. . . .
Such an attempt does not aim at reassuring modern man by saying to him:
"You no longer have to believe this
and that." To be sure, it says this
among other things, and may thereby
relieve his pangs of conscience; but
if it does so, it does so not by
showing him that the number of things
to be believed is smaller than he had
thought, but because it shows him that
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to believe at all is qualitatively different from acceRting a certain number
of propositions.°
In this connection, Bultmann insists on his own close

association with Llitifer! a-. way ttft tbiAking:? r- Veimythazigig lag
is not only permissible, it is necessary, in order to
insure th vitality of a faith fixed on the proper focal
points. As he has said repeatedly,
Demythologizing is the radical application of the doctrine of justification
by faith to the sphere of knowledge and
thought. Like the doctrine of justification, demythologizing destroys every
longing for security. There is no difference between security based on good
works and security built on objectifying
knowledge. . . . He who abandons every
form of security shall find the true
security.Y
We have now come to the question of what happens when
Bultmann demythologizes. The answer has been indicated in
what we have already said. One of Bultmann's characteristic
emphases is the fact that you cannot interpretlin arvaamm.
You cannot approach the Biblical material in an absolutely
cold and objective fashion. The basic presupposition for

every form of exegesis is that "your own relation to the
subject-matter prompts the question you bring to the text
and elicits the answers you obtain from the text."1° The
approach which you favor is your hermeneutic, and you are
far ahead in the game if you realize that you must have a
hermeneutical principle, and therefore you choose one with
care. Bultmann has approached the problem head-on. Since
every interpreter is dependent on conceptions which he has
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inherited from a philosophical tradition, "our question is
simply which philosophy today offers the most adequate
perspective and conceptions for understanding human existence. Here it seems to me that we should learn from
existentialist philosophy."11 Here lies Bultmann's famed
relation to Martin Heidegger. John Macquarrie's comment on
the relation of Biblical and existentialist thought is
instructive:
What existentialism teaches about the
being of man has a certain kinship
and sympathy with the understanding of
his being implicit in biblical thought,
so that the theologian who approaches
the Bible with an existentialist understanding of being is likely to interpret
its teaching in a way which would be
faithful to the authentic thought of
the biblical writers themselves.12
Bultmann's major debt to existentialism lies in his understanding of eschatology, and this in turn relates to
history--specifically, the relation between universal
history and personal history. This he develops at great
length in his Gifford Lectures. The point is clear:
The meaning in history lies always in
the present, and when the present is
conceived as the eschatological present. by Christian faith the meaning
in history is realized. . . . Always
in your present lies the meaning in
history, and you cannot see it as a
spectator, but only in your responsible
decisions.13
This is the heart of Bultmann's existentialist theology (and
we should note that Bultmann demythologizes because of his
commitment to existentialist interpretation, and not viceversa--demythologizing is really a secondary concern). The
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overarching concern is for a life of decision called into
question in the present, and his theological thrusts may
be sorted out under this heading. If we demythologize,
we do so in order to have the Biblical message confront us
in the present, and here we should note what Bultmann says
about Biblical eschatology. In a very real sense, history
ended in Jesus Christ, and Bultmann sees Biblical precedent
in making this emphasis. The process of demythologizing
the early Christian conception of Jesus began partially
with Paul, and radically with John. Although Paul still
expected the end of the world as a cosmic drama, "with the
resurrection of Christ the decisive event has already
happened."14 But for the more radical John, "the coming
and departing of Jesus.is!the::esdhatologicalyevent.
The resurrection:of,Jesus;. Pentecost and the parousia of
Jesus are one and the same event, and those who believe
have already eternal life."15 As Bultmann demythologizes
eschatology, he has some creative insights--"As in the
conception of heaven the transcendence of God is imagined
by means of the category of space, so in the conception of
the end of the world, the idea of the transcendence of God
is imagined by means of the category of time."16 In the
face of this transcendence, the world is empty in its
transitoriness. But it is also empty "because men have
turned it into a place in which evil spreads and sin rules.
The end of the world, therefore, is the judgment of 'God."17
Further, "the end of the world has not only a negative but
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also a positive meaning. To use nonmythological terms, the
finiteness of the world and of man over against the transcendent power of God contains not only warning, but also
consolation."18"'The function of New Testament eschatology,
then, once we rid it of its Jewish apocalyptic trappings,
is to point to the direct confrontation of God and man in
an ever-present eschatological Now. But at this moment of
confrontation, another element is also always present-the eschatological event of Jesus Christ. This brings into
focus the remaining elements in Bultmann's thought. The
moment of confrontation, of decision, is radically different
for Christian and non-Christian. Here is the kerygma which
Bultmann is so insistent upon preserving. Here is where
the choice is made between authentic and inauthentic existence. Here is where the power of preaching creates faith.
It is in this concern for the present that existential
philosophy makes its contribution to man's understanding.
Existentialism insists that man is a historical being, and
his existence is true only in the present acts of existing:
He realizes his existence if he is aware
that each "now" is the moment of free
decision: What element in his past is to
retain value? What is his responsibility
toward his future, since no one can take
the place of another? No one can take
another's placeA since every man must die
his own death.
And yet for all the value of existentialist philosophy in
clarifying man's position and the poles of his existence,
we must see that its function is purely preliminary. It
brings clarification and understanding, but not power. It
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tells man his condition, but it does not release him from
it: "Existential philosophy, while it gives no answer to
the question of my personal existence, makes personal 1;
existence my own personal responsibility, and by doing so
it helps to make me open to the word of the Bible."2° In
his essay, "Humanism and Christianity," Bultmann has carefully explained the difference between faith and non-faith
at the moment of decision. As always, he goes out of his
way to be scrupulously fair in evaluating both sides of the
picture. Humanism is not the presumptuous faith in man that
sets man above all. Rather,
humanistic faith is faith in the idea of man which stands as a norm above his
em ►irieah: life, prescribIng-hia - dutyand
thereby bestowing upon him dignity and
nobility. Humanism is faith in the
spirit of which man partakes, the spirit
by whose power man creates the world of
the true, the good, the beautiful, in
science and philosophy, in law and in art.21
And further,
for humanism there is genuine freedom
only in the acknowledgment and acceptance
of a norm superior to the subjective,
arbitrary will. The freedom of subjective
arbitrariness is a delusion, for it delivers
man up to his drives to do just that at any
moment vi4Ach at the moment lust and passion
dictate.
Finally, "autonomy, understood in its genuine sense, is
theonomy, for the law of the spirit which is consented to
in freedom is the law of God."23 But, having cited humanism's value, we must point up its differences from Christianity--differences which lie in the realm of the Beyond.
For humanism God's Beyond is spirit of
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which man with his spirit partakes. . .
For the Christian understanding, God is
always the hidden one and the coming
one. God's Beyond is his constant
futurity, his constant being-outbefore. With this transcendent God
man has companion only in openness to
the future.

•

The either-or of humanism and Christianity ultimately is
this: "Does man will to live his life by his own resources,
his own power, or by the grace of God? . . As the Christian faith knows that man receives his real life not from
the law but by grace, it also knows that it is precisely
grace which provides the power to fulfil the law."25 And
now, to be very explicit, to reach the essential point,
"This word of grace has been made concrete in Jesus Christ,
who is present as the word of God in the proclamation of
the church. n26
Here we are face-to-face with Bultmann's understanding
of Jesus Christ as eschatological event. It is in this
connection that he advances his controversial views on the
significance of the crucifixion and resurrection.

"According

to the New Testament the decisive significance of Jesus
Christ is that he--in his person, his coming, his passion,
and his glorification--is the eschatological event."27 The
eschatological event of Jesus Christ is a once-for-all event.
"Once for all" is not the uniqueness of an
historical event but means that a particular
historical event, that is, Jesus Christ, is
to be understood as the eschatological "once
for all." As an eschatological event this
"once for all" is always present in the
proclaimed word, not as a timelms truth,
but as happening here and now."4°
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And what is achieved in this moment of decision? Through
God's grace in Jesus Christ, the believer gains his self
by losing his self. He is open to the future, while the
possibilities of the future bring only anxiety and fear
to the non-Christian. "The future always offers to man
the gift of freedom--Christian faith is the power to grasp
this gift."29 And again: "The New Testament speaks and faith
knows of an act of God through which man becomes capable of
self-commitment, capable of faith and love, of his authentic
life."30 And so man is always what he is at the present
moment of decision--"The adjective 'Christian' can never
qualify the substantive character. Only the decision of
each new moment can be called 'Christian.'"31
When we speak of the eschatological event of Jesus
Christ, we are speaking, first and foremost, about crucifixion and resurrection. Bultmann presents his views about
this clearly and succinctly in "New Testament and Mythology."
It is the cross which is the central event in Christianity.
It is the crucifixion, not the resurrection, which is the
true stumbling-block of Christian faith--the skandalon that
all of God's power is concentrated in a naked man dying on
a cross. "The abiding significance of the cross is that it
is the judgement of the world, the judgement and the deliverance of man."32 Through the power of the cross we are crucified with Christ--we lose our life, and therefore are
capable of finding it. At each eschatological moment of
decision in our lives, the cross of Christ gives us the
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power to choose authentic existence--"If it is true that the
Christian faith involves free openness to the future, then
it is freedom from anxiety in the face of the Nothing. For
this freedom nobody can decide of his own will; it can only
be given, in faith."33 The cross of Christ is not merely
mythical; it is an actual, observable, , historical event.
But it is not merely this, either. It is a historical event
with cosmic significance, an event which reaches into each
present moment with its power. And here lies its connection
with the resurrection:
The meaning of the cross is not disclosed
from the life of Jesus as a figure of past
history, a life which needs to be reproduced
by historical research. On the contrary,
Jesus is not proclaimed merely as the
crucified; he is also risen from the dead.
The cross and the resurrection form an
inseparable unity.
What, then, is their relationship?
The resurrection is not a mythical event
adduced in order to prove the saving
efficacy of the cross, but an article of
faith just as much as the meaning of the
cross itself. Indeed, faith in the
resurrection is really the same thing as
faith in the saving efficacy of the cross.35
And again, "If the event of Easter Day is in any sense a
historical event additional to the event of the cross, it
is nothing else than the rise of faith in the risen Lord,
since it was this faith which led to the apostolic preaching."36
TheranistnbedenyingthatoBultpannlis logioailytconbistenti
at this point. The reason for his views lies in his insistence on existentialist theology, not in his demand for
demythologization. Christianity provides power for the ever-
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present moments of decision in personal existence. Faith
in the cross brings the power to crucify the self, to trust
solely in God to care for the future, to choose the selfless options of love and sacrifice. The resurrection puts
the seal on this. It is an affirmation of our faith in the
cross. As we have died in the crucifixion, we have new life
in the resurrection. The only historicaNydemonstrable fact
of that first Easter is that the disciples were new men.
Their faith had risen. Did Jesus actually rise from the
dead? At

one;:: _>: level of existence the answer must be

yes, for the disciples demonstrated the power of the
resurrection. In their lives and faith, He had risen. The
moments of decision in their lives confirmed this. Jesus
rose in their kerygma, in their preaching. Is the resurrection an event that can be tested by scientific measurement? No, "the resurrection cannot be a miraculous proof
capable of demonstration and sufficient to convince the
sceptic that the cross really has the cosmic and eschatological significance ascribed to it."37 Was the tomb actually
empty? Only to eyes of faith. And, existentially speaking,
it is beside the point anyway. Crucifixion and resurrection
are one eschatological event in the life of the Christian.
At this point we must develop questions and answers
hinted at in this understanding. How do we come to believe
in the cross as thef',cross of Christ and as the eschatological
event? There is only one answer--through preaching. "Christ
meets us in the preaching as one crucified and risen. He
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meets.us in the word of preaching and nowhere else. The
faith of Easter is just this--faith in the word of preaching."38
One of the strtlang assets of Bultmann's theology has been
his pointing up again the central significance of preaching
in the work of the church. In fact, for Bultmann, one of the
great glories of the church is that this is where the proclamation is continued and carried on. The emphasis is decidedly a
traditional one: God comes to us in His Word.
God meets us in His Word, in a concrete
word, the preaching instituted in Jesus
Christ. While it may be said that God
meets us always and everywhere, we do
not see and hear Him always and everywhere, unless His Word supervenes and
enables us to understand the moment here
and now.39
God's Word is not existential philosophy. Even more to the
point, it is a Word rooted in history. Here Bultmann sees
one avenue by which he can approach those who are put off
by his lack of historical consciousness--"This living Word
of God is not invented by the human spirit and by human
sagacity; it rises up in history. Its origin is an historical
event, by which the -speaking of this word, the preaching, is
rendered authoritative and legitimate. This event is Jesus
Christ."40 What is normative for Christian faith is precisely
a historical event, but an event that has present significance.
This is the kerygma, the proclamation of the saving act of
God-The kerygma maintains that the eschatological
emissary of God is a concrete figure of a
particular historical past, that his eschatological activity was wrought out in a human
fate, and that therefore it is an event whose
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eschatological chare-ter does not admit
of a secular proof."1
The kerygma is that which cannot be demythologized; God
has specifically acted for man in Jesus Christ. And yet
this kerygma is not simply the announcement that Jesus died
on the cross and rose again. Kerygma, proclamation,
preaching, brings the, event into the present. It is a call
to a decision for authentic existence. As Bultmann describes
it in his Theology of the New Testament, the proclaimed
word
is kerygma--herald's service--in the
literal sense--authorized, plenipotent
proclamation, edict from a sovereign.
Its promulgation requires authorized
messengers, "heralds," "apostles" (=
sent men)(Rom. 10:13-17). So it is,
by nature, personal address which accosts each individual, throwing the
person himself into question by rendering his self-understanding problewatic,
and demanding a decision of him.m'‘
This dual aspect of kerygma (historical fact and personal
address) is necessary to rescue preaching from the charge
of being a history lecture, on the one hand, or a lecture in
humanistic ethics on the other. Kerygma is the preaching of
an event, but it cannot take a- completely objective form
since it calls men into question in the multiplicity of
their actions. Erich Dinkier, one of Bultmann's closest
followers, summarizes Bultmann's position in this way:
The kerygma in the New Testament contains
the calling and challenging Word of God
occurring in the redemptive act of Christ,
the Word of God spoken in the man Jesus
of Nazareth once for all, Og-17---- . This
ke
a, the proclamation of God as acting
n the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ
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for us, is part of the paradoxical event
and cannot be oNectified if it is understood in faith.
And this leads us to the final aspect of Bultmann's
thought--the role of faith. Faith is not the abandoning of
the modern world view for the world view of the first century. It is not merely intellectual assent that certain
things happened at certain times two thousand years ago, or
agreement about a body of doctrine concerning these events.
Faith is commitment of oneself to the life revealed in Jesus
Christ. It is an agreement to live up to the obedience
demanded by God, and a seizing of the power God gives to
obey those demands. It is sacrificing oneself in every
present decision in order to gain one's self, in order to
become a new being. It is trust in God above all things.
As Bultmann says it, faith "is both the demand of and the
gift offered by preaching. Faith is the answer to the
message. Faith is the abandonment of man's own security,
and the readiness to find security only in the unseen
beyond, in God."44 And more: "Faith in the sense of obedient
self-commitment and inward detachment from the world is only
possible when it is faith in Jesus Christ."45
"The purpose of my existential interpretation of myth is
precisely to inquire into the possibility of a valid meaning
for the mythical picture of the world, and in this I am
trying to proceed methodically, n46 says Bultmann. This
remark, directed against the "arbitrary assertions" of Karl
Barth, is a clue to the radical honesty and integrity,4ith
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which Bultmann approaches his task. Starting from the fine
vantage point of taking the secular world seriously, he is
making one of the most significant attempts of our time to
communicate with "a world come of age" (in Bonhoeffer's
later happy phrase). But because his approach is radical,
because he has made concessions which have not been made
before, a number of men have attacked him at a number of
points. Many of the questions asked are valid (although
some could only stem from reading him carelessly or
belligerently), and facile answers which explain away
every objection accomplish nothing.
One of the major legitimate criticisms of Bultmann
is that he has lost the historical nature of the Biblical
revelation, the pattern of Heilsgesohichte which is the
heart of the Biblical message. This criticism comes from
a number of respected figures concerned with Lutheran or
Roman Catholic orthodoxy-Walter Kunneth, Ernst Kinder,
Paul Althaus, Ludwig Ott, Karl Adam, to name a few. Oscar
Oullmann's remarks are relevant here, as he notes that the
foolishness of the cross
is not, as Bultmann thinks, a faith
in that which is not within man's
control and at his disposal. That
faith many Greeks would have been
able to accept and to express with
the aid of real myths. But that
the redemptive act is an historical
datum, that was "foolishness for
Greek thgught and is that for modern
thought.'ff
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As we shall see, this criticism applies much more to Fritz
Burl and Schubert Ogden than to Bultmann, but it does point
up the historical problem in Bultmann I s theology. In dealing
with this, we must realize that the objection works with a
particular conception of history--history understood as a
process which takes place within a stable metaphysical
framework. This understanding was almost certainly that of
the Biblical writers and undoubtedly that of the Middle
Ages, but this does not mean that it is necessarily normative
for us. Bultmann has developed his answer in his Gifford
Lectures, but in this connection he draws on the work of a
colleague very close to him in his general theological
outlook. This colleague is Friedrich Gogarten, and his
book, Demythologizing and History, is an attempt to speak to
this point. Within the historical approach to theology,
according to Gogarten, two points of view are discernible,
each guided by its own concept of history. One is the
"official" theology of the church, which thinks in terms
of objective historical happenings on which Christian faith
can be based. But the existential view of history, a view
which has its roots in Dilthey and Troeltsch, maintains that
history is not an object which can be viewed from the outside. Rather, personal involvement is absolutely necessary-"Modern man is able to envisage history only from the point
of view of his own responsibility for it."48 Again, "whenever
one is concerned with history one is concerned also with
the historical character (Geschichtlichkeit) of human
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existence. . . . This means that the historical character of
human existence is involved in every approach to history.
Therefore, faith can never be established by demonstrating
that certain objective happenings took place in the past.
with arises on the basis of an existential interpretation
of the sacred history, which lets us see it as the disclosure
of our own historical existence, responsible under the Word
of God. It is interesting to note that Gogarten insists
that this existential understanding was Luther's understanding,
lying behind his sole fide principle. Whether Luther's name
is invoked or not, it is obvious that this radical shifting
of the historical nature of faith, from a series of saving
events in the process of the world to the history of a
personal existence, will not satisfy everyone. And yet
ita. can be argued; that the one understanding is as legitimate
as the other, or (avoldiagamititagntsopitfallootnauttal
ezclusidm). one is as necessary as the other. In any case,
although existentialist interpretation forsakes the "official"
understanding of history, demythologization as such does not
necessarily do so, as we have seen from all that Bultmann has
said about the nature of myth.
Associated with the historical criticism is the complaint
about the loss of the corporate nature of Christian faith in
Bultmann's great insistence on the personal character of
faith. To a certain extent this is true, although his
equally strong emphasis on existential encounter offsets this
somewhat. At the same time, Krister Stendahi, noting that
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Bultmann is not faithful to Pauline theology in this regard,
also observes that Bultmann is not much further away from
Paul than Augustine and Luther, with their great concern for
introspection and individual reconciliation.50
Probably the greatest protest against Bultmann's theology has been directed against his conception of the
resurrection gaining significance dieLe4pethebdgh Itsliaftielpation in the event of the cross. But it must also be remembered that for this very reason Bultmann says that the
resurrection is not a mythological occurrence, but an
eschatological event. Roy Harrisville reminds us that
Bultmann's interpretation "does not constitute an outright
denial of the objective facticity of the resurrection, but
rather the possibility of its verification."51 Again, in
his existential approach, Bultmann is working within a
tradition of history which states that "there is no truth
apart from engagement in it."52 The entire question is an
exceedingly complex one, and we cannot investigate all the
avenues of inquiry here. It may well be asked if what
Bultmann says about the meaning of the resurrection is
completely faithfUl'to the Biblical witness, since Paul
himself states that he can only proclaim the word of the
cross as Gospel because of the resurrection.

mu difficult

to make the Bible say that the resurrection is subordinate

to the cross, or can stand merely as an introduction to or
a faithful response to the cross. Much more can and must be
said about the resurrection than Bultmann does. And yet we
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must see that what he does say is a valid and important
emphasis, even if it does not constitute the whole truth.
In terms of the approach to life as being lived in encounter,
with decision in the present moment of paramount importance
for existence, this understanding of the power of the
resurrection is necessary. What Bultmann says has been

picked up a number of times in the preaching of the resurrection, and rightfully so. For example, a fine popular
treatment of the work of the Holy Spirit in Creating
resurrection faith unmistakably echoes Bultmann's emphasis-What Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit
are concerned about is that the resukrection must happen in our hearts, not
simply that Christ must rise from the
dead. He has risen from the dead. His
task now is to rise in our hearts. Only
if we proclaim His resurrection can He
do this. All the work of God in Jesus
Christ comes to nothing unless He does
rise in us.53

By way of transition we may mention the criticism of
Bultmann that he renders theology unnecessary in his extensive use of existential philosophy. That he makes use of
philosophy, particularly Heidegger's existentialia, is
patently true. Whether theology is rendered unnecessary
in the process is another question. Existentialist.philoaophy, for Heidegger and others, attempts to find categories
in which to describe the form and structure of existence.
Heidegger characterizes human existence as care (Sorge),
and this has a threefold structure. First, there is
possibility, the fact that "man's being gets projected ahead
of itself."54 This is reflected in Bultmann's constant
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allusions to man's openness to the future. Second, there is
facticity, the influence of man's environment upon him, man's

"thrownness." "Man is thrown into a world to exist there in
his situation."55 Basically, man's anxiety reveals this
aspect of his existence to him. Third, there is fallenness-Nan flees from the disclosure of anxiety to lose himself in
absorption with his instrumental world, or to bury himself
in the anonymous impersonal existence of the mass, where no
one is responsible."56 When this happens, man has fallen
from the possibility of authentic existence into inauthentic
existence. Now, how does one rise above inauthentic existence? Bultmann has used Heidegger's existential analysis
of the human situation to great profit, but when it comes to
the question of coping with the problems of existence, they
part company. Heidegger, in his later thought, moves on to
a consideration of conscience, a coming to terms with the
fact of death and the confrontation with the "nothing," and
an involvement in "being;" eventually he reaches a mystical
region of thought somewhat analogous to Zen Buddhism. This
later development will be discussed more fully below. Bultmann picks up some of these thrusts, but he differs basically
as to how freedom from care is to be accomplished. He insists that one cannot achieve freedom on one's own--power
only comes through the kerygma, the proclamation Of the
eschatological event of Jesus Christ. It is the kerygma
which differentiates Christianity from secular philosophy,
and Bultmann will not surrender this. As he says in a
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typical passage,
In the fact that existentialist philosophy
does not take into account the relation
between man and God, the confession is
implied that I cannot speak of God as my
God by looking into myself. My personal
relation with God-can be made real by God
only, by the acting God who meets me in
His Word.57
A more substantial criticism of Bultmann's use of
existentialist philosophy comes from his left (all the
criticisms we have considered come from the orthodox
group to his right). From this quarter the complaint comes
that Bultmann is not consistent in his use of existentialism,
that he cannot stop short of demythologizing the kerygma.
Thisaeads us into a consideration of the ways Bultmannt s

thogght has been developed by "post-Bultmannian" theologians.
One of the leading figures in the demand for "dekerygmatization" is the German theologian, Fritz Burt. Drawing on
Jaspers (as Bultmann draws on Heidegger), Buri insists, in
his "theology of existence," that "grace and revelation are
not given in a special act, but are given with existence
itself."58 Christianity offers nothing that cannot be gained
in philosophy. Its value lies in the almost unique depth of
existential insight available in Christian mythology, and it
is the task of theologians to exegize this Christian mythology.
Butt's call for dekerygmatization has been brought into
prominence in America by Schubert Ogden. In his book, Christ
Without Myth, Ogden especially takes Bultmann to task for a
"structural inconsistency" in his theology. On the one band,
Bultmann holds that authentic existence is possible to man as
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man, but on the other hand authentic existence is possible
for man only through faith in Jesus Christ.

Summarizing

Bultmann's argument, Ogden says that Bultmann
introduces the distinction between a
"possibility in principle" and a
"possibility in fact." He argues that,
although the natural man has the possibility
in principle of understanding himself
authentically, he does not have this
possibility in fact, since, as he
actually exists, he has always lost
this possibility and can recover it
only in consequence of God's act in
Jesus Christ. Y
For Ogden this is an inconsistent position, and he cites

Kant as hit authority--"Du kannst, denn du solist; and unless
this rule can be shown to be false--and, as we have indicated-it appears to be self-evident--the conclusion just drawn
cannot be evaded. u60 Ogden assumes his position with a
number of theologians of the "left" whom he names, as he
accepts the first proposition and denies the second-it is
true that man has. the _possibility of

.existence in

principle, but it is not true that man does not have this
possibility in fact: "When it is viewed from the standpoint of
modern man's picture of himself and his world, his claim that
authentic historicity is factually possible only in Jesus
Christ must be regarded as just as incredible and irrelevant
as the other myths with which it properly belongs. "61 But,
contrary to Ogden, we should note that Bultmann has impressive
authority on his side for maintaining this paradox of existence.
For example, Reinhold Niebuhr, talking about original sin, is
saying much the same thing when he maintains that although
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sin is inevitable, it is not necessary. The same emphasis
is part of the doctrine of original sin in the Formula of
Concord, where it is inSisted that sin is not substance, but
accident. Nevertheless, refusing to acknowledge that this
inconsistency may be a necessary paradox (Thomas Oden has
pointed out that Ogden is quite alone in his position62),
Ogden goes on to formulate a "constructive alternative" to
Bultmann's proposals. He suggests two principles toward this
end. First, "the demand for demythologization that arises
with necessity from the situation of modern man must be

accepted without condition."63 This means that the kerygma
too must be demythologized, and is essentially the same

proposition as Burl had made. The second principle is that
"the sole norm of every legitimate theological assertion is
the revealed word of God declared in Jesus Christ, expressed
in Holy Scriptures, and made concretely present in the
proclamation df the church through its word and sacraments."'
This sounds very conservative, and is indicative of Ogden's
own inconsistency, or at least indicative of a failure on his
part to express clearly what he has in mind. The candle is
burning at both ends. After proposing this second prinoiple,
he will again .go on to say that the only final condition for
sharing in authentic life is "a condition that can be formulated
in complete abstraction from the event Jesus of Nazareth and
all that it specifically imports."65 This condition is that
one "must understand himself in the concrete situations of
his existence in the authentic way that is an original
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possibility of his life before God."66 The fact that Ogden
had not fully satisfied his own standards for constructive
suggestions does not mean that what he has to say is not
worthwhile and thought-provoking reading. There are a number
of rather enigmatic hints at the implications of his suggestions. Although it is true that even in his subsequent articles he still has not accomplished his purposes satisfactorily (an indicative statement appears in a 1963 article-"The whole meaning of this [Chris] event is to express or
reveal God's transcendent love as the sole basis of our authentic existence u67), Thomas Oden's comment about him is generous
and fair--"His discussion may increasingly be recognized as
perhaps the most decisive affirmation of the grace of God as
Creator in contemporary theological literature."68
It is interesting to note that a very cautious conservatism goes right along in insisting that if we allow Bultmann's
position, we must allow Ogden's. There can be no temporizing,
no qualifications. Commenting on Christ Without Myth, K.
Runia says,
It cannot be denied that this view is
consistent. We for ourselves believe
that this is indeed the logical outcome
of Bultmann's starting point. Bultmann
himself may not draw these-conclusions,
but it was to be expected that others would
go further. In the long run half-way
positions cannot be maintained.°9
For this kind of criticism, it is apparently inconceivable
that one can demythologize and still remain a Christian,
that one can acknowledge. the pervading influence of the
world view of the first

century in the Scriptural materials and still claim that the
kerygma must be maintained and that.God has acted supremely
and decisively in Jesus Christ. John Macquarrie has approached
this problem with great insight in his The Scope of DemytholoFizing, and his conclusion is noteworthy: "The limit to
demythologizing is nothing other than the recognition of the
difference between a philosophy of human existence and a
religion of divine grace."7°
In addition to the liberal development of Bultmann's
views by Buri and Ogden, there are two other significant
trends which have developed from the theology which he
originated--the new quest for the historical Jesus, and the
implications of the later Heidegger for theology.71
Perhaps the most important thing to note about the new
quest is that its adherents insist that it is new. There is
no attempt to come to the same conclusions as the nineteenth
century quest or that of Albert Schweitzer. There are two
major differences from the old quest: first, there is now a
frank recognition that the sources are not coldly factual,
biographical reports, but kerygma which tells us how the
primitive church believed in and preached Jesus as the Lord;
second, the emphasis in the old quest lay in establishing
the distance between the Jesus of the Gospels and the Jesus
of history, whereas the emphasis in the new quetit is establishing
the unity between the Christ of the kerygma and the Jesus of
history. It is easy enough to see how this stems from
Bultmann. He has insisted that the kerygma be based on Jesus
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of Nazareth, a concrete figure of history, even if the
incarnation, atonement, and resurrection are mythological
expressions through which one interprets existence, rather
than objective statements about the life of Jesus. Now,
still following Bultmann, the new quest asks to what extent
the kerygma continues Jesus' understanding of Himself. This
is not a question of His inner feelings, but of an understanding
that overflowed into actions and words. This is an attempt
to encounter the whole person of Jesus through the individual
sayings and actions in which His intention and self hood are
latent. This is accomplished by sifting the synoptic
Gospels for the actual sayings and deeds of Jesus, and then
examiang them for what they reveal about His self-understanding.
In this process, everything is rejected that has a kerygmatic
tone, since this may have been . composed by the church. Also
excluded from consideration are any Gospel materials which
could have arisen in contemporary Judaism. According to James
M. Robinson's A New quest of the Historical Jesus (Robinson
is the leading American figure in the movement), there are
now two ways of gaining knowledge about the person of Jesus.
One is the via kerygmatica--the church's kerygma presents an
understanding of Jesus which it presupposes to be a continuation of His own understanding of Himself. The other is the
via historica--modern historiography uses the non-kerygmatic
material of the Gospel to reconstruct the self-understanding
of the historical Jesus. Thus history, as well as the kerygma,
offers to those who accept it the possibility of authentic
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existence. The new questers claim they have established
that Jesus intended a historical encounter with Himself to
be an eschatological encounter with God, and that He consequently understood His existence as that of bringer of
eschatological salvation. This does not prove that the
kerygma is true (which lies beyond proof and is in the realm
of faith), but that the kerygma is faithful to Jesus. This
optitistic appraisal of the situation has been undercut by
Bultmann himself. He agrees that Jesus' own message may
reveal a great deal about His understanding of existence, but
this is ultimately irrelevant to faith. What is proclaimed
by faith is not Jesus' understanding of existence, but the
crucified and resurrected Christ. In Jesus' ministry we have
only the promise; in the kerygma we have the eschatological
fulfillment. It is the resurrection faith that turndothe""once"
into the "once for all," that makes what Jesus did on Golgotka
not lust a past event, but an event which is present. for me.
Since Bultmann's criticism, others have been having second
thoughts as well about the value of the new quest, and the
movement which was so strong in the fifties has become less
sure of itself in the sixties.
The third trend following Bultmann is the attempt to
translate the later philosophical thought of Heidegger (as
opposed to the early Heidegger which Bultmann used) into
theological research, a translation bringing into prominence
the necessity of a "new hermeneutic." The leading figure in
this movement is Heinrich Ott, wbo is much concerned with
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establishing a mediating position between Barth and Bultmann.
The shift in thought from the early Heidegger to the later
Heidegger can best be characterized as a move from existentialism to ontology, a shift of focus from human existence
to the problem of being. itself. Authenticity is no longer
understood as a living out of one's own proper potentialities,
but as the sheer "letting be" of "what is." Ott sees this
position of the later Heidegger as supporting Barth far
more than Bultmann. As with Barth, the movement is away from
the self and its understanding of existence toward that which
is given. For the philosopher, this given is being; for the
theologian, it is the revelation of God. Heidegger has taken
his early characterization of human existence as care, with
its carefUlly elaborated threefold structure of possibility,
facticity, and fallenness, and shown how the anxiety involved is due to the confrontation with nothing--both the
nothing of meaninglessness and the final nothing of death.
But now this in turn leads to the confrontation,with the
wonder of being, the great insight that man's encounter with
nothing leads to his realization of the reality of being. Man
can escape anxiety by accepting what is. This means that the
early existentialia are done away with, or are at best a step
on the way to the knowledge of being. Ott is intent on
showing that the freedom from all presuppositions indicates
that theology should move beyond Bultmann in his extensive
dependence on the philosophical presuppositions of the
existentialia. Apparently Bultmann was appealing to a
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philosophical position so incomplete as to be misleading.
Furthermore, the truth of being expresses itself in language.
Being speaks through man in language. Language uses man.
This is why Heidegger places such an emphasis on poetry as a
means of reaching the truth (an example is his interest in
H8lderlin). The creative urge involved in poetry and the
ability of poetic language to suggest is a way of being's
unveiling itself. Here he is in accord with the modern
literary theory of New Criticism, which, in speaking of the
"intentional fallacy,-" makes the same point--one explicates
a poem to find out what it says rather than to find out
what the poet meant to say. It is this concern for language
that introduces us to the "new hermeneutic," for language
itself is hermeneutic. Bultmann. speaks of the necessity of
hermeneutical presuppositions for theology, and here he
refers, as we have said, to existential self-understanding
as the point of reference for his own theology. But now the
function of hermeneutic is vastly wider. Hermeneutic refers
to the fact that being (or, to use Heidegger's suggested
analogy for theology, God) reveals itself in man's language.
For Bultmann, the real task of exegesis is to interpret the
text. In the post-Bultmannian hermeneutic, the text interlprets us. The self-understanding found in the text leads to
a criticism of one's own self-understanding. And this is
not merely a presupposition, but rather a goal.
How does this effect Bultmann's program of demythologizing? Certainly thb principle behind demythologizing, the
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need to interpret the Scriptures in terms intelligible to
modern man, is not abandoned. But Bultmann emphasizes that
the Christian language of the New Testament has often
become an obstacle to understanding. In the new hermeneutic
the Biblical language, while it may not be identified with
revelation, reveals God, and so Christian language is not
irrelevant or optional. The problem is not so much that of
demythologizing language so that Scripture is brought up to
modern man; rather, modern man must be brought back to the
Scripture so that his distorted relationships may be criticized. There is less emphasis on the human element in language and more on the relationship between language and
being.
This Isemzurelpeafte of the most fruitful directions to
which Bultmann's theological emphases have developed, although
he himself has so far dissociated himself from the movement.
He has re-emphasized the fact that language speaks only in
man's speaking, and has said that Ott and the others have
minimized the inescapable relation of language to man. Although this may be true, it is an objection that does not
begin to come to terms with all the implications of the new
hermeneutic (taLg. Heidegger speaks of man as being a "clearing
for being"). It is also significant to note that although
this new approach modifies Bultmann's work, it is no more
amenable to Heilsgeschichte theology than he was, even though
the Old Testament is again brought into serious consideration.
Perhaps Gerhard von Rad's approach--the Word mediating the

34
event--will come into prominence in this area. We should
also observe that Lutheran theology, emphasizing the role
of the Word as a means of grace, can both learn and offer a
great deal in the development of the new hermeneutic.
Finally, in cantbevsrgned that although Bultmann's
theology has been taken in an important new direction, his
work has by no means been eclipsed. Much of what he has said
about the existential interpretation of Scripture remains as
valuable as it ever was. Most of his theology will be applicable to the new situation, although perhaps in a modified
form. All of his research remains as a monument to great
scholarship. And the program for demythologization remains
in force. In fact, if there is one major criticism to be made
of Bultmann, it is that he has not taken myth seriously
enough. To be sure, he has said again and again that
"whereas the older liberals used criticism to eliminate the
mythology of the New Testament our task to-day is to use
criticism to interpret it."72 Yet one wonders if he has
always really meant it. He qualifies this greatly when he
says, "Myth indeed speaks of a reality, althOugh in an
inadequate way."73 Bultmann almost seems ready to replace the
myth with the existential interpretation of it. And this is
where the criticism levelled at him by theologians of the left
and right, by later Heideggerians and Tillichians, is extremely
important. We cannot dispense with myth, saying that the
existential interpretation is finally the only possible
method of approaching it. Richard Grabau summarizes this
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point quite well when he says, "No one who insists upon the
necessity of myth implies that there are myths that cannot
be existentially interpreted. The only thing implied is
that the existential interpretation does not constitute or
exhaust the myth."74 And again,
Men have made many meanings out of myth:
a literal, an allegorical, a moral, etc.
Bultmann adds another: the existential.
The difference between Bultmann and the
earlier theologians is this. They thought
that there really was myth and a plurality
of interpretations which they tried to
delineate. Each of the interpretations
had its integrity and its function. None
completely articulated the myth, nor did
they all together. It remained always as
the source of and control over the interpretations. Bultmann on the other hand has
no patience with this. He denies validity
to any other interpretation than his own.-(5
Ian Henderson was one of the first to make the same point for
the English-speaking world before Bultmann's work was translated-The mythological is a basic form of
human thought from which, consequently, we can never free ourselves. It is the way in which the
human mina works when it tries to
apprehend and to describe religious
objects. Myth is thus a legitimate
form of human thought; it is, in fact,
the only one in which tha,supersensible can be grasped.m
The point of all this is that myth must be taken seriously. This is the emphasis of the later Heideggerian
pronouncements on language, and it is something that poets
have always known. Myth cannot simply be equated with
fiction, for the events of myth reveal depths of being
which the intellect can see only obliquely. This is the
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reason why the great nineteenth century poet, William Blake,
embodied in his verse the Christian visions which he turned
into a private mythology. William Butler Yeats employed
Irish myths early in his poetic career, and then moved on to
create his own mythology as a structure for his magnificent
poetry. Similar examples abound. D. H. Lawrence's The
Plumed Serpent is structured on elements of Christianity and
the myth of the Mexican god Quetzalooatl. In Finnegans Wake,
James Joyce fuses elements of classical, Christian, and
Hebraic myths to create a universal myth which he felt would
embody the experiences of all men. The function of myth as
structural principle has been developed by Northrop Frye in
his Anatomy of Criticism-The mythical mode, the stories about gods,
in which characters have the greatest
possible power of actionki is the most abstract and conventionalized of all
literary modes, just as the corresponding
modes in other arts--religious Byzantine
painting, for example--show the highest
degree of stylization in their structure.
Hence the structural principles of literature are as closely related to mythology
those of
and comparative religion
painting are to geometry. t(
Behind this lies the basic principle that "the meaning or
pattern of poetry is a structure of imagery with conceptual
implications."78 Translating this into theological discourse--the Bible is mythology with conceptual implications.
The task of theology is to uncover these conceptual implications, but this cannot be done at the expense of the
mythology. A literary critic does not explicate Yeats's
poems and then conclude that we can dispense with the structure
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of imagery, the mythology, there. Ultimately this would
mean that we could forget about the poems and just read the
critic's essay--an option most readers would choose to
bypass. This situation would be unattractive not only
for aesthetic reasons (the rhythm and the radiance and the
tightly-controlled organization would be lost), but also for
reasons of truth (the poem would invariably be distorted as
some elements are brought into undue prominence and others
are forgotten completely). One appreciates the explication,
the theology, for the aid to understanding that it provides,
but one also realizes that the complete truth lies only in
the poem, the mythology, as it is presented as the basic
given.
This analogy with poetry suggests again another criticism
that has been directed at Bultmann, namely, that his program
of demythologization leaves no reason to assume that the
Christian myth is more authoritative than classical myth, or,
for that matter, the mythology of William Butler Yeats. We
have seen that Buri and Ogden would, in large measure, subscribe to just this view and place poetry (in their case,
philosophy) on the same level of revelation as theology. But,
again, Bultmann, while acknowledging the power and truthfulness in secular affirmations, has insisted on preserving the
kerygma, the historic core that God has acted in Jesus Christ,
an action centering in the crucifixion and resurrection. In
a manner of speaking, myth is fiction, and there is no scientific method by which the objective happenings descrtbed in
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the Christian myth can be verified while the objective
happenings in other myths cannot. Here, as Bultmann continues to remind us, faith plays its part: "The action of
God is hidden from every eye except the eye of faith. Only
the so-called natural, secular (worldly) events are visible
to every man and capable of proof. It is within them that
God's hidden action is taking place."79 Understanding that
Christian mythology will not be usurped by existential
interpretation, we must nevertheless realize the compelling
truth of this interpretation. As Bultmann says,
"De-mythologizing makes clear the true meaning of God's
mystery. The incomprehensibility of God lies not in the
sphere of theoretical thought but in the sphere of personal
existence. Not what God is in Himself, but how He acts with
man, is the mystery in which faith is interested. "8° And
further, the mystery of God lies not inthe fact that He
"interrupts the natural course of events," but that He
encounters me "in His Word as the gracious God."81
"Our understanding of religion must be contemporary,"
says*John Macquarrie.
By this we do not mean that it must
conform to the philosophical vogue of
the moment. But we mean that there
can be no escape from the twentieth
century to the times of the New Testament or of the Middle Ages or of the
Reformation. No doubt we can learn
much from all of these times. But
what is required is an understanding
of religion relevant to our own time,
that is to say, an understanding
which comes to grips with the problems
which . . . the current mood of our
civilization causes us to notice.
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Hultmann's theology--and the later Heideggerian theology
which develops from it--are contemporary in this best sense
of the word. This paper has attempted to suggest that
Hultmann's great contributions to contemporary theology
have been twofold. First, there is his mature existential
theology, which, if it is not understood as an exclusive or
complete interpretation, brings a necessary accent of Scripture into the prominence it deserves. Second, there is his
program of demythologization, a program which can be implemented as the interpretation, not the elimination, of
Christian myth. It is a program whioh enables the Gospel
to speak to modern man with new power, for false and unnecessary stumbling blocks have been removed. The corrective
influence of the theology developed from the later Heidegger,
the "new hermeneutic," is important here. As Krister
Stendahi has observed, "Hultmann's plea for demythologizing-regardless of the way in which he carries it out--is certainly here to stay."83
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